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Abstract
Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of
initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the infor-
mation necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control
the amount of information revealed, we analyse how his decision interacts
with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to
obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where
consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another
with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only
result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers
decide about disclosure.
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Zusammenfassung
Elektronischer Handel und flexible Produktionstechnologien ermo¨glichen
eine kostengu¨nstige Personalisierung ehemals standardisierter Produkte, aller-
dings beno¨tigt der Produzent hierfu¨r Informationen vom Kunden u¨ber dessen
Pra¨ferenzen. Ausgehend von der Annahme, daß die Kunden selbst daru¨ber
entscheiden ko¨nnen, in welchem Ausmaß sie diese Informationen preisgeben,
wird hier analysiert, wie diese Entscheidung des Kunden mit der Preispolitik
eines Monopolisten interagiert, der mit Hilfe zusa¨tzlicher Informationen zwar
das Produkt besser an die Wu¨nsche des Kunden anzupassen vermag, sein
Wissen allerdings auch dazu mißbrauchen kann, sich einen gro¨ßeren Anteil
des Handelsgewinns anzueignen. Bei heterogenen Pra¨ferenzen der Konsumen-
ten zeigt sich sowohl fu¨r den Fall einer einheitlichen Zahlungsbereitschaft,
als auch fu¨r den Fall unterschiedlicher Kundentypen mit hoher und niedriger
Zahlungsbereitschaft, daß die Konsumenten nur dann zu einer vollsta¨ndigen
Informationsrevelation bereit sind, wenn sich der Monopolist im Vorfeld der
Revelationsentscheidung glaubhaft an ein Preisschema binden kann.
JEL-Klassifikation: D82, D42, L14
Schlu¨sselwo¨rter: Elektronischer Handel, Personalisierung, Asymmetrische
Information, Preisdiskriminierung
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1 Introduction
The concept of a “prosumer” has been introduced in 1980 by the futurist Alvin
Toﬄer in his book “The Third Wave” as a blend of producer and consumer. He
imagined a future type of consumer becoming involved in the design and manu-
facture of products in a way that they could be made to individual specification.
Basing product design decisions appropriately on implicit or explicit information
about customer preferences has always been a key factor for economic success in
any business. Also personalization has been the traditional way of production in
many areas of craftsmanship as for for example taylors, shoemakers and the like.
However, a manufacturer or a national service provider has until recently been re-
stricted to sell a standardized product or at most a limited number of differentiated
goods or services. Electronic commerce, partially in conjunction with flexible ma-
nufacturing, now provides the opportunity to obtain the information necessary for
personalization from customers all over the world at low cost and, specifically in the
case of digital products, to tailor general-purpose goods or services to the specific
needs of each customer (“mass customization”).
While personalization enhances the value of a product for the consumer it is not
necessarily in his interest to reveal his personal information. Besides privacy issues
(see Varian, 1997) it are the conflicting interests of buyers and sellers that may
make the consumer reluctant to become a prosumer: He must fear that the seller
may be able to abuse the information to obtain a bigger share of the total gains from
trade. In our paper we will discuss this problem in the context of an asymmetric
information game between a potential buyer with private information about his taste
and his willingness to pay and a monopolist that uses information obtained from
the customer to personalize the product and to optimize his pricing policy.
Our paper is closely related to some other work that deals with issues in electronic
commerce: As in Bakos (1997) who considers the impact of a reduction in search
costs caused by electronic coordination we assume that product characteristics are
located on a Salop circle. The versioning paper by Varian (2000) is similar to our
analyses insofar as consumers may differ with respect to their willingness to pay.
However, while Varian analyses the incentives to sell goods of different quality, in
our analysis the buyer may signal his valuation by revealing some specific amount
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of private information. Another related paper is Acquisti/Varian (2001) where the
behavior of market participants is analysed in a setting with suppliers that are ab-
le to observe (for example by way of cookies) whether a potential buyer is a new
customer or not. Our central theme, the interaction of personalization, mass cu-
stomization and price discrimination is analysed in two papers by Ulph and Vulkan
(Ulph/Vulkan, 2000 and 2001): In both papers consumers differ with respect to their
most desired product and knowledge about the characteristics of their customers al-
lows a firm to charge different prices. There are two main differences to our analysis:
It is assumed that firms already know the specific taste of each consumer and there
are two firms in the market that compete in price strategies. In Ulph/Vulkan (2000)
each firm is located on another end-point of an Hotelling line and is only able to price
discriminate (but not to personalize the product). Mass customization (personaliza-
tion) is then introduced in Ulph/Vulkan (2001) and it is shown that in equilibrium
firms often choose both mass customization and price discrimination although both
sellers would be better off by not adopting the two technologies.
Our work is complementary to the papers by Ulph und Vulkan insofar as we con-
sider the incentives of consumers (instead of producers) to accept a personalization
strategy and to disclose the relevant information. To keep the analysis tractable we
do assume that the product is provided by a monopolist (instead of considering duo-
poly competition) which in our opinion also helps to highlight the specific aspects
of the decision by the consumer. We deal with two distinct effects of information
revelation: (i) Information about the taste of the consumer enables the monopolist
both to customize the product appropriately and to base his pricing decision on
the information obtained. (ii) Consumers may not only differ with respect to the
location in product space but also with respect to their general willingness to pay
for this kind of good. In this setting, revealing more or less information about the
location may also deliver a signal about the valuation of the customer.
In section 2 we analyse the first effect in isolation and derive the optimal amount
of information disclosure as a function of the given uniform willingness to pay for
a perfectly personalized product. We extend the analysis to incorporate the second
effect in section 3 where we consider a situation with high and low valuation con-
sumers to study how signalling aspects affect revelation incentives. In section 4 we
show how the results change if the monopolist is able to commit to a maximum price
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before information is disclosed by the buyer. Section 5 summarizes our findings and
presents some suggestions for further research.
2 Consumers with identical willingness to pay
We consider a game between a risk neutral monopolist and a continuum of risk
neutral consumers located uniformly on a Salop circle (see Salop, 1979). The actual
position lc of a consumer is private information. The monopolist may customize his
product by choosing any location lf . To simplify matters and to enable concentration
on information revelation and signalling issues, production and personalization is
assumed to be costless. The perimeter of the Salop circle is normalized to a value of
two which yields a maximum distance |lc − lf | equal to one.
The consumer may (partially) reveal his position to the monopolist. This is done
by choosing some value i ∈ [0, 1] that changes the Salop circle by multiplying the
perimeter by 1− i. Therefore, i = 0 indicates that no information is revealed while
i = 1 stands for telling the monopolist the exact location lc. For values of i between
zero and one, the maximum distance between lc and lf is reduced so that the product
while not perfectly personalized is at least more likely to be closer to the customer’s
location.
The time structure is as follows: In a first step the consumer determines the informa-
tion revelation parameter i. The monopolist then arbitrarily chooses some location
lf on the modified Salop circle and sets the monopoly price p
M . Finally the consu-
mer decides about buying the given product at the specified price by comparing this
price with the utility derived by a product at location lf .
Gross utility of a consumer is given by u = vmax − |lc − lf | where vmax indicates
the valuation for a perfectly personalized product, i. e. a product where locations
lc and lf coincide. The consumer will accept the offer of the monopolist whenever
u ≥ p. Without information revelation |lc − lf | is distributed uniformly between
zero and one. The probability of trade is then given by Pr(u ≥ p) = vmax − p
for p ∈ [max{0, vmax − 1}, vmax]. The monopolist will set pM in order to maximize
expected return pPr(u ≥ p) = p (vmax− p). For i > 0 we obtain a modified demand
schedule Pr(u ≥ p) = 1/(1 − i)(vmax − p) — for each price it is now more likely
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that the consumer accepts the monopolist’s offer. At i = 1 the product is perfectly
personalized and for pM ≤ vmax trade occurs with certainty.
In figure 1 we attempt to visualize the effects of information revelation: We consider a
consumer with valuation vmax = 1/2 and display inverse demand curves for different
values of i. All inverse demand curves start on the price axis at vmax. Note that
in our analysis “demand” stands for the probability of trade — a given consumer
either wants to buy one unit of the good or nothing. For i = 0 demand is given by a
falling straight line with a slope of −1, the line gets flatter with rising i and finally
becomes horizontal at i = 1.
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Abbildung 1: Consumer with vmax = 1/2: Information revelation and pricing
Based on the linear inverse demand curves it is straightforward to determine the
monopoly solution: For Pr(u ≥ p) < 1 the marginal revenue MR of the risk neutral
monopolist is given by a straight line with twice the slope of the respective demand
curve while at Pr(u ≥ p) = 1 the marginal revenue becomes zero. We can now
discuss the implications of the optimal strategies in the second stage of the game:
• For i ∈ [0, 1/2) gains from trade are not assured even if the monopolist chooses
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the competitive price p = 0.
• For i ∈ [0, 3/4) the monopolist maximizes profits by setting a price pM = 1/4
and at this price the probability of trade is always smaller than one (it starts
at 1/4 for i = 0 and approaches 1 at i = 3/4). Revelation of information up to
i = 3/4 thus not only increases the possible gains from trade but also reduces
the monopoly distortion. As can be seen by a look at the consumer surplus
triangles abci and the profit rectangles below, consumer and monopolist equally
share the gains from information revelation.
• Beyond i = 3/4 the monopolist chooses the highest possible price that guaran-
tees trade for any lc — for example p
M = 3/8 at i = 7/8. While this pricing
policy ensures an efficient solution, it also helps the monopolist to increase its
share of total surplus which in turn yields an absolute reduction of expected
consumer surplus relative to the situation at i = 3/4: Triangle abc3/4 is big-
ger than triangle ab′c7/8. Finally, at i = 1 social surplus will be maximized
(each product sold is perfectly personalized), however, all gains from trade are
appropriated by the monopolist.
Given our game structure, the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by partial
disclosure of information i∗ = 3/4 and a resulting monopoly price pM(i∗) = 1/4.
While at this equilibrium monopoly distortions in the pricing decision are eliminated,
some asymmetry of information remains and thus total surplus is not maximized.
Having started with a situation where in the initial situation without information
revelation gains from trade are not assured, we will now discuss how higher valuati-
ons vmax will affect revelation incentives. In figure 2 we compare the results obtained
for vmax = 1/2 with two additional situations: For vmax = 1 trade would take place
even without any information disclosed at the competitive price pC = 0, however,
monopoly pricing yields a probability of trade below one. This monopoly distortion
will be absent at vmax = 2 (and also for higher values of vmax).
As can easily be seen, the amount of information revelation in equilibrium decreases
with rising consumer valuation because the elimination of the monopoly distortion is
assured for lower values of i: For vmax = 1 we obtain equilibrium strategies (i
∗, p∗) =
(1/2, 1/2) and for vmax ≥ 2 information revelation is no longer in the interest of
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Abbildung 2: Comparing information revelation and pricing for vmax = 1/2, 1 and 2
the consumer and (i∗, p∗) = (0, vmax − 1). The amount of information disclosed in
equilibrium can be written as a function of vmax:
i∗(vmax) = 1− vmax
2
for vmax ∈ [0, 2] (1)
A second interesting point that can be visualized in figure 2 is the maximum im-
provement in total surplus that may be realized by information revelation. While
the relative change is larger the smaller vmax, the absolute effect by revealing all
information is maximized at vmax = 1: The potential gain is given by the area abcde
which is bigger than the triangle a′b′c′ that represents the same effect for vmax = 2
and, exceeding 1/2, is also bigger than the effect for vmax = 1/2.
To sum up our results in this section: (i) While disclosing all information would
allow to perfectly personalize the product and thus maximize total surplus, choosing
this strategy is not in the interest of the consumer because the monopolist would
fully appropriate this surplus. (ii) Partial revelation of information is the optimal
strategy for the consumer as long as the probability for trade in the game without
information revelation is below one. (iii) The lower the valuation of a consumer, the
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more information he will disclose in equilibrium. (iv) The relative change in total
surplus that may be realized by revealing all information is larger the lower the
valuation of the consumers, however, the absolute change approaches a maximum
at vmax = 1
3 Two types of consumers and signalling
After having discussed the situation with uniform valuation for the perfectly perso-
nalized product, we do now consider the case where consumers differ with respect to
their willingness to pay. To keep the analysis tractable we assume that there are only
two types of consumers, t = {h, l}, with both types equally likely and h indicating
high valuation consumers with vmax = 1 and l referring to low valuation customers
with vmax = 1/2. We also restrict the strategy space of buyers: The amount of in-
formation revelation may either be zero (labeled in for “no information revealed”),
i = 1/2 (is for “some information revealed”) or i = 1 (ia for “all information revea-
led”). We have chosen these values for the following reasons: (i) i = 1/2 represents
the optimal value for the high valuation consumer and existence of a pure strategy
separating equilibrium seems to be most likely at this optimal value. (ii) To reveal
all information has been included as an option because there might exist a pooling
equilibrium where this strategy is chosen. Also, as will be shown in section 4, disclo-
sing all information is an equilibrium action for the high valuation consumer if the
monopolist can commit in advance to some maximum price.
3.1 Strategies, Beliefs and Payoffs
Following the standard backward induction logic we start at the end of the game,
where the consumer has to decide whether he will buy the product at the specified
price. Note that the consumer’s buying decision not only depends on the price but
also on his type and on the distance between the locations lc and lf . Because in gene-
ral neither the exact location lc nor the type of consumer is known to the monopolist,
he faces a demand curve that provides him with the (subjective) probability of trade
for a given price. While the monopolist cannot directly charge different prices for
different types, the price may depend on the signal observed. When receiving signal
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i, the monopolist will assign some probability that the sender of such a signal is of
type h. Assume now that these beliefs are correct (as they will be on the equilibrium
path) and denote by θi the actual proportion of type h consumers as a fraction of all
customers that choose some signal i. Under this assumption we obtain (conditional)
demand functions xi(pi, θi) that denote the probability for a sender of information i
to actually buy the product at price pi:
xn(pn, θn) =
{
1
2
+ 1
2
θn − pn if 0 ≤ pn ≤ 12
θn(1− pn) if 12 < pn ≤ 1
(2)
xs(ps, θs) =
{
1− 2ps(1− θs) if 0 ≤ ps ≤ 12
(2− 2ps)θs if 12 < ps ≤ 1
(3)
xa(pa, θa) =
{
1 if 0 ≤ pa ≤ 12
θa if
1
2
< pa ≤ 1
(4)
The demand curves are kinked at pi = 1/2 because at prices above 1/2 only cu-
stomers of type h may buy the product. We get the total expected demand Q by
summing up the products wixi where wi denotes the share of consumers that have
chosen to send signal i: Q =
∑
iwixi. Note that wi has no effect on the pricing deci-
sion of the monopolist since we assume that he will set his price after receiving signal
i: Conditional on the signal i ∈ {in, is, ia} he has been observing, the monopolist
will choose a price pMi to solve the profit maximization problem:
pMi = argmax
pi
piMi = wi · pi · xi(pi, θi) (5)
While wi has no effect on p
M
i , the profit maximizing price at some signal i depends on
the respective proportion of high valuation customers, θi. As we have stated above,
this actual proportion has to match the monopolist’s belief for each information
set (that is, signal i) which will be reached in the game with positive probability.
Solving the the maximization problem for each signal we obtain
pMn (θn) =
1 + θn
4
(6)
pMs (θs) =
{
1
2
if θs >
1
2
1
4−4θs
if θs ≤ 12
(7)
pMa (θa) =
{
1 if θa >
1
2
1
2
if θa ≤ 12
(8)
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Based on these considerations we are now able to determine the expected utility
E[ut|i(t) = i] ≡ uti of a type t consumer who has chosen strategy i in the first stage
of the game. This expected utility depends on the probability of gains from trade
Pr(ut ≥ pi) and the expected consumer surplus if trade occurs which is given by
(vtmax − pi)/2:
uti =
Pr(ut ≥ pi)(vtmax − pi)
2
(9)
The consumers’ expected utility is affected by pi in two ways: First the price has
an influence on the purchasing decision as higher prices will reduce the probability
of gains from trade. Moreover, in case of buying the product, consumer surplus will
be lower the higher the price. Given the information about the pricing decision of
the monopolist from equations (6) to (8) we can derive the expected utility for both
types of consumers at any strategy i ∈ {in, is, ia} as a function of the belief θi of the
monopolist. For the low valuation customer we receive
uln(θn) =
1
32
(
1− 2θn + θ2n
)
(10)
uls(θs) =


(
1−2θs
4−4θs
)2
if θs ≤ 12
0 if θs >
1
2
(11)
ula(θa) = 0 (12)
while the payoffs for a buyer with high willingness to pay are given by
uhn(θn) =
1
32
(
9− 6θn + θ2n
)
(13)
uhs (θs) =
{
2−3θs
4−4θs
if θs ≤ 12
1
4
if θs >
1
2
(14)
uha(θs) =
{
1
2
if θa ≤ 12
1
2
if θs >
1
2
(15)
Based on these payoff functions and the profit function in (5) it is now straightfor-
ward to determine the equilibria of the signalling game.
3.2 Equilibria of the signalling game
In a signalling game we have to consider three possible types of equilibria: Pooling
equilibria where no information is revealed, separating equilibria where the signal
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gives perfect information about the type and semi-separating equilibria where so-
me types play mixed strategies. To obtain these equilibria we apply the concept
of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that combines subgame perfection with Bayesi-
an updating in order to obtain reasonable beliefs on the equilibrium path. Where
appropriate, we add some additional refinements to rule out unreasonable out–of–
equilibrium beliefs. In a first step we restrict attention to pure strategies and check
whether any combination of signals (i(h), i(l)) by the low and high valuation type
yields an equilibrium at permissible beliefs of the monopolist. However, as will be
shown no separating equilibrium exists and the existing pooling equilibria are only
supported by unreasonable out–of–equilibrium beliefs. Thus, in a second step, we
consider mixed strategies and derive a semi-separating equilibrium that seems to be
the most likely outcome of the game.
3.2.1 Pooling equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium both types of consumers choose the same strategy sh =
sl = spc and therefore disclose the same amount of information i about their locati-
on. At the equilibrium path the monopolist updates his belief according to Bayes’
rule, properly assuming that both types l and h play the equilibrium strategy with
probability one. Thus in any pooling equilibrium the monopolist’s ex-post belief
will comply with the common prior distribution of the consumer types, i. e. he still
assesses a probability of 1/2 for each type. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium it is
assumed that the monopolist is free to chose any out–of–equilibrium beliefs if he
observes a deviation from the equilibrium path. Thus a pooling equilibrium has to
satisfy the following conditions:
• The monopolist’s beliefs are consistent with common priors that are updated
according to Bayes rule whenever possible. On the equilibrium path of the poo-
ling equilibrium beliefs therefore correspond to the common prior distribution
of types h and l: θi|i=spc = 1/2.
• Given some out–of–equilibrium beliefs of the monopolist (i. e. for i 6= spc),
neither type has an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy.
These requirements are sufficient to eliminate a pooling equilibrium where both con-
sumer types do not disclose any information, i. e. choose strategy in. In accordance
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with an equilibrium belief θn = 1/2 such a strategy would result in a monopoly
price pn = 3/8. However, a type h consumer would have an incentive to deviate:
Choosing strategy is would generate an expected utility between 1/4 and 1/2 (the
exact value depends on the firm’s belief θs) while the expected utility of strategy in
just amounts to the lower value of 25/128.
However, two other pooling equilibria may be constructed by assuming extreme
beliefs at the deviation paths:
• An equilibrium (P1) where both types choose spc = is, i. e. partially disclose
their location information, is sustained by the customers fear that a deviation
will be interpreted by the monopolist as a signal for a high willingness to pay.
To be more exact, the beliefs θs = 1/2 at the equilibrium path and θa > 1/2
and θn = 1 off the equilibrium path support this pooling equilibrium. The
corresponding price strategy sMc of the monopolist is characterised by ps = 1/2,
pn = 1/2 and pa = 1.
• An other pooling equilibrium (P2) with spc = ia, i. e. both types reveal all
information, can be supported in a similar manner if the monopolist has a
belief of θa = 1/2 at the equilibrium path and expects the consumer
to be of type h with probability θs > 1/2 and θn = 1, respectively, when
observing a deviation. The corresponding prices are pa = 1/2, pn = 1/2 and
ps = 1/2.
Although both pooling equilibria are Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, forward induction
arguments render them quite unreasonable: Note that in both pooling equilibria, P1
and P2, the high valuation consumer would be strictly worse off if he deviates while
type l is just indifferent between all strategies. However, the out–of–equilibrium
beliefs assert that the monopolist assumes that type l will deviate with a lower
probability! Also note that equilibrium P1 is pareto dominated by P2, while P2
can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (see Cho/Kreps, 1987): For any out–of–
equilibrium belief of the monopolist the type h consumer cannot benefit by deviating
from the equilibrium strategy. Thus, for this type of consumer, any action outside
P2 is equilibrium dominated. This is not the case for type l: Deviation to in will be
profitable if the monopolist does assign a sufficiently low probability for deviations
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by type h (for whom, as just discussed, this action is equilibrium dominated and
thus quite unlikely).
3.2.2 Pure strategy separating equilibria
Now consider separating equilibria: In a separating equilibrium each type of a player
must choose a different pure strategy. Playing an equilibrium strategy st = i(t) will
thus inform the seller that the consumer is of type t and the monopolist will update
his beliefs accordingly. Updating will thus result in a belief of θi|i=sh = 1 if the
equilibrium strategy of type h has been observed while the monopolist will base his
pricing decision on θi|i=sl = 0 when the equilibrium strategy assigned to type l has
been played. When he observes a strategy that deviates from any equilibrium path,
the monopolist is once again free to choose any belief about the customer’s type.
Obviously, no type will reveal all information:
• Let us first consider type h: Choosing ia would yield a price pa = 1. This
can not be an equilibrium strategy because the expected utility of the consu-
mer equals zero and is therefore lower than for any other strategy (especially
compared with a strategy that imitates the l-type consumer).
• A separating equilibrium where the low valuation consumer discloses all in-
formation is also not feasible. In this case the monopolist would set a price
pa = 1/2 which gives an incentive for type h to mimic type l.
Thus only two candidates for a separating equilibrium remain:
• First consider the strategy profile {(sh = in, sl = is), (pn = 1/2, ps = 1/4, pa =
1)} combined with the corresponding beliefs {θn = 1, θs = 0, θa > 1/2}, that
is, the monopolist expects the sender to be of type h when no information
is revealed while is signals type l. Provided these beliefs, however, the high
valuation customer could do better if he mimics the type l consumer: Sending
a signal in would increase his expected utility from 1/8 to 1/2.
• The reverse case can be ruled out in a similar manner: Consider strategy
profile ({sl = in, sh = is}, {pn = 1/4, ps = 1/2, pa = 1}) and beliefs {θn =
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0, θs = 1, θa > 1/2}. Again type h has an incentive to mimic the low valuation
consumer because that would raise his expected surplus from 1/4 to 9/32.
As a consequence no pure strategy separating equilibria exist in the signalling game.
3.2.3 Mixed strategies and Semi–separating equilibrium
We now proceed by examining the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in which
at least one type randomizes over his pure strategies. Whenever the probability
distributions applied for randomizing differ between the two types, the monopolist
is able to update his prior beliefs when observing some signal i. If only one type plays
some strategy with positive probability, the monopolist obtains perfect information
when he observes this signal. We therefore will refer to the latter case as a semi-
separating equilibrium.
First note that neither type will chooses complete information disclosure with posi-
tive probability in any mixed strategy equilibrium: Type l will never play ia because
he obtains zero utility from this strategy (ia is thus weakly dominated by is and in).
Now suppose that the monopolist has observed a consumer playing strategy ia: Ac-
cording to the reasoning above the only consistent belief is to assume that the sender
is of type h with probability θa = 1. Thus the seller will set a price pa = 1 which
yields zero utility to the consumer. As a consequence, neither type will completely
reveal his information to the monopolist.
Therefore we can restrict attention to mixed strategy equilibria where both types
play only the pure strategies in and is with positive probability. Now consider a
mixed strategy equilibrium in which type t chooses strategy i with probability wti .
Note that for each type of customer the probabilities wtn and w
t
s must add up to one
as ia is supported with probability zero. Because w
h
s = 1 − whn and wls = 1 − wln,
we can identify the randomization strategy of a player of type t by wtn only. Based
on the respective probability of each type we are also able to derive the consistent
ex-post beliefs of the monopolist on the equilibrium path:
θn =
whn
whn + w
l
n
(16)
θs =
1− whn
2− whn − wln
(17)
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Note that a player who is willing to randomize between pure strategies has to be
indifferent between playing any of the pure strategies that he plays with positive
probability in the mixed strategy. Applied to our case his expected utility has to be
the same whether he chooses in or is. For type h we therefore can state that
2− 3θs
4− 4θs =
1
32
(
9− 6θn + θ2n
)
(18)
and after inserting (16) and (17) into equation (18) and rearranging terms appro-
priately, we get the condition
1 + whn − 2wln
1− wln
=
(2whn + 3w
l
n)
2
8(wln + w
h
n)
2
. (19)
Similarly, a low valuation consumer has to be indifferent between in and is, when
choosing to randomize his strategies, i. e.(
1− 2θs
4− 4θh
)2
=
1
32
(
1− 2θn + θ2n
)
(20)
which yields (
whn − wln
1− wln
)2
=
(wln)
2
2(whn + w
l
n)
2
. (21)
Now we must consider three possible scenarios:
• First let us assume that only type l randomizes. In this case whn will either be
zero or one while wln has to lie between these values. Hence type h chooses a
pure strategy.
• Similarly type h may choose a mixed strategy while type l decides in favour
of strategy in or is.
• If both types choose mixed strategies, the solution to the game will correspond
to the solution of a linear system that consists of equations (19) and (21).
An examination of all these cases shows that a unique semi-separating Perfect Baye-
sian Equilibrium in mixed strategies exists: Only consumers of type h randomize
between in and is while the low valuation customers always conceal their location
information. To be more precise, the equilibrium is characterised by a strategy profile
(s∗f , s
∗
c) ≡ {(sh = whn =
√
2/2−1/2, sl = wln = 1), (p∗n = 1−
√
2/2, p∗s = 1/2, p
∗
a = 1)}.
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From equations (16) and (17) we receive the corresponding equilibrium beliefs
{(θ∗n = 3− 2
√
2, θ∗s = 1, θ
∗
a > 1/2)}.
The expected utility for both consumer types, ul and uh, can then be calculated by
using the equations (10), (13) and (14):
ul(in, θ
∗
n(s
∗
c)) =
3
8
− 1
4
√
2 (22)
uh(in, θ
∗
n(s
∗
c)) =
1
4
(23)
uh(is, θ
∗
n(s
∗
c)) =
1
4
(24)
To compute the expected total profit, ΠM , we must first determine total demand Q.
Note that we obtain the signal proportions wi by adding up the respective conditional
probabilities and recognising the common prior distribution of the types: wi = (w
h
i +
wli)/2. To determine total expected profit, these shares have to be multiplied by
p∗i · xi(p∗i , θ∗i ):
Π(s∗f , s
∗
c) =
∑
i
w∗i · p∗i · xi(p∗i , θ∗i ) (25)
Π(s∗f , s
∗
c) = xs · p∗s ·
(
1− wln
)
+
(
1− whn
)
2
+ xn · p∗n ·
wln + w
h
n
2
(26)
By inserting the equilibrium values of θ∗i , p
∗
i , w
t
i , and demand functions (2) to (4)
into equation (26), we finally obtain total profit:
Π(s∗f , s
∗
c) = (1− 2p∗s (1− θ∗s)) p∗s ·
1− whn
2
+
(
1
2
+
1
2
θ∗n − p∗n
)
p∗n ·
1 + whn
2
(27)
=
3
8
− 1
8
√
2 +
(
1− 1
2
√
2
)(
1− 1
2
√
2
)(
1
4
+
1
4
√
2
)
(28)
=
1
4
(29)
Note that total profit of the monopolist and consumer surplus of the high valua-
tion type are lower than in the (unreasonable) pooling equilibrium P2, while both
high valuation customer and the monopolist receive exactly the same payoff values
as in the less efficient pooling equilibrium P1. However, the low valuation consu-
mer is better off because he will now obtain a positive expected surplus, while this
surplus does not exceed zero when a pooling equilibrium P1 or P2 is played. There-
fore, the inefficient pooling equilibrium P1 is also dominated by the semi-separating
equilibrium.
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To summarize the arguments mentioned above, both pooling equilibria P1 and P2
fail to resist to some forward induction arguments: (i) P1 does not appear to be
a reasonable equilibrium because of two reasons: Firstly, it is pareto dominated by
the semi-separating equilibrium. Secondly, it is based on implausible beliefs. (ii) P2
can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion. As a consequence, the semi-separating
equilibrium — which is indeed not affected by any refinements — remains as the
only reasonable outcome of the signalling game.
4 Price commitments and screening
Until now we have assumed that the consumer first chooses the amount of infor-
mation disclosed and, observing this choice, the monopolist decides on his product
location and the profit maximizing price offer. While the timing with respect to
the location decision seems quite reasonable, the monopolist might have an incen-
tive to set his price before the consumer moves. Such a commitment is likely to
be feasible under the specific assumptions of our model, however, it might be more
difficult to obtain in more realistic settings where the exact product location may
affect production costs and a priori unknown extra costs for full personalization may
exist.
Nevertheless we will now consider how our results change if we allow the monopolist
to post a price offer in stage zero of the game, i. e. before the consumer chooses
i. Note that such an offer could be made binding insofar as a higher price is no
longer feasible by signing an enforceable contract stating that the product has to
be provided at the prespecified price. However, because it might be in the interest
of both the monopolist and the consumer to reduce this price if the consumer has
disclosed less information than expected (i. e. deviated from the equilibrium path),
the contract must be renegotiation proof in the following sense: Even after a pareto
improving reduction of the price a deviating consumer must get a lower utility than
he would get in the equilibrium.
The idea behind this restriction on feasible price offers may be best illustrated in
the setting with only one type. Consider the case of a consumer with vmax = 1.
As shown in section 2, the privately optimal amount of information revelation by
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such a consumer is given by i∗ = 1/2 and the monopolist will accordingly set a
price p∗ = 1/2. While this yields efficient consumption (the price is low enough to
ensure that the product is sold for any location lf chosen by the monopolist), total
surplus is not maximized because the product is not perfectly personalized. This
is due to the fear of the consumer that after choosing i = 1 the seller would set
a price pM(i = 1) = 1 which yields zero surplus for the buyer. By choosing the
equilibrium value i∗ = 1/2, however, the consumer can ensure an expected utility
E[uh|i = 1/2] = 1/4. What happens if the monopolist commits to a price pM = 1? At
first sight it seems as if an equilibrium (ie = 1, pe = 1) could be realized. However,
suppose that the consumer deviates from this equilibrium by choosing i < 1: If
the seller insists on pe = 1 no trade occurs and both consumer and monopolist
obtain zero surplus. The seller would therefore have an incentive to post a second
offer that yields at least some probability of trade. Given these considerations, we
must determine the optimal deviation of the consumer (the equilibrium amount of
information disclosed in the game without commitment) and restrict the range of
feasible price offers to these that guarantee at least the consumer surplus obtained
under optimal deviation. In our example the expected utility is 1/4 if the consumer
chooses i∗ = 1/2 instead of ie = 1 and thus the price offer may not exceed p = 3/4
(which yields a consumer surplus of 1/4 at i = 1). As easily can be shown the
optimal price offer pPC (with “PC” standing for “price commitment”) is generally
given by pPC = vmax − (1 − i∗)/2 and applying the formula for i∗ in equation (1)
from section 2 we obtain
pPC(vmax) = 3/4vmax for vmax ∈ [0, 2] (30)
In the case with an homogenous willingness to pay we thus obtain the following
result: The ability to set the monopoly price before the consumer decides about
information revelation makes it possible to implement the surplus maximizing equi-
librium (iPC = 1, pPC = 3/4vmax (for vmax ∈ [0, 2] — for higher vmax we get
pPC = vmax − 1/2). In this equilibrium the monopolist commits to not expropriate
a consumer who reveals his information: This is done by setting a price that offers
a consumer surplus equal to that obtained for optimal revelation in the situation
without commitment.
How does this analysis extend to the case with two types? Pooling equilibria are not
affected because higher prices than p∗ = 1/2 would yield no trade with the low valua-
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tion type (and thus no pooling) and committing to a lower price is not in the interest
of the monopolist. When considering separating equilibria, however, commitment by
the monopolist completely changes the situation: In section 3 there only existed a
semi–separating equilibrium where the high valuation consumer partially disclosed
information with positive probability. Now we are able to show that the monopolist
may separate the two types by setting a pricing menu (pa = 3/4, pn = 1− 1/
√
2).
The argument goes as follows: (i) At this menu type h has just no incentive to choose
in to mimic type l because without information revelation his expected utility at
p = 1 − 1/√2 is just equal to 1/4, the utility derived for sure if he chooses ia. (ii)
A separating equilibrium where the low valuation type reveals more information
than the consumer with the higher willingness to pay is neither feasible (type h
would always have an incentive to mimic typ l) nor in the interest of the monopolist
(even if separation would work it would yield lower profits than the price menu
considered above). (iii) There does not exist a combination of prices (pa, ps) that
form a separating equilibrium: At pa = 3/4 the price ps that ensures that type h
would not like to mimic type l must be at least 1/2 and at this price there would
be no trade with a type l consumer. Finally we have to check whether a marginal
reduction of pa that allows a type separating price ps < 1/2 would be in the interest
of the monopolist. This would be the case if the additional profit ps(1−2ps) exceeds
the profit loss due to the necessary reduction of pa which is given by 1/2− ps. The
resulting condition 2ps − 2p2s − 1/2 > 0, however, cannot be fulfilled in the relevant
range ps ∈ [0, 1/2].
5 Conclusion
Would you like to be a prosumer and reveal detailed information about your prefe-
rences to a seller? We showed in a monopoly setting how the answer to this question
might depend on your valuation of the product and on the commitment ability of
the monopolistic seller you are facing:
• We first considered a situation where consumers differ with respect to the ex-
act location in product space but have an identical valuation for the perfectly
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personalized product. In this setting a prospective buyer will provide all in-
formation necessary for personalization if the monopolist is able to commit to
a maximum price before he obtains this message. However, if commitment is
not feasible, a consumer will only disclose some information. While this stra-
tegy reduces expected total surplus, it is chosen by the buyer to avoid total
extraction of the surplus by the seller. In this setting we
obtained the result that the lower the probability of trade without disclosure
(i. e. lower valuation) the larger the amount of information revealed.
• Matters get more complicated if consumers also differ with respect to their
willingness to pay. In this case a signalling game results where low valuation
consumers have an interest to be distinguishable from types with a high wil-
lingness to pay in order to obtain a lower price while high valuation consumers
want to avoid expropriation of surplus and also have an incentive to mimic the
type with the low willingness to pay. These effects render disclosure of infor-
mation less attractive and thus without price commitment by the monopolist
there only exist pooling equilibria with quite unreasonable beliefs and a mi-
xed strategy separating equilibrium where only the high valuation consumers
reveals part of his information with positive probability.
If, however, the monopolist is able to commit in advance to some maximum
price, we have a screening game where the monopolist offers a menu of prices
as a function of the amount of information disclosed. In this setting a pure
strategy separating equilibrium exists where types with a high willingness to
pay get a personalized product at a relatively high price while low valuation
consumers provide no information and obtain a standardized but much cheaper
product.
Note that we obtained these results in a model where personalization is costless
and thus we are more likely to overstate the amount of information revealed. On
the other hand, introducing competition might reduce the monopoly power of the
seller and thus consumers may be less reluctant to provide the information. It should
thus be interesting to combine the duopoly model from Ulph/Vulkan (2001) with the
information revelation approach discussed in the present analysis. Another promising
generalization is the consideration of a continuum of signals and/or types in the
signalling game.
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